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The two pages on this site of mine (Ray Dubuque) are based on an excellent study entitled
"JUST WAR THEORY AND THE RECENT (1996 ) U.S. AIR STRIKES AGAINST IRAQ, by Mark Edward DeForrest, an
Assoc. Professor of Legal Research and Writing at Gonzaga University. I have separated his study into two pages in order to present only the theoretical part in this page, and then the application of "The PRINCIPLES of JUST WAR " to the particular instance Professor DeForrest lays out in great detail in a separate page.
I. Introduction
II. A general overview of Just War Theory
A. Background of Just War Theory
B. Main Sources of Just War Theory
1. The religious Sources of Just War Theory
2. The secular Sources of Just War Theory
B. Generally Recognized Principles of Just War Theory
The following is on a separate page, i.e. JustWarPrinciples-2.html:
III. Application of Just War Theory to U.S. Actions
A. Factual Background
B. Analysis of U.S. Actions
IV. Conclusion
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I. INTRODUCTION (1)
One of the perennial realities of human existence is war. From the earliest recorded
events of human history all the way through to modern times, human communities have
engaged in armed conflict as a method of dispute resolution. While war has been a
constant part of the human experience, there has also been a tendency within virtually all
human civilizations to limit the extent of war and the methods by which warfare may be
conducted.(2) In Western civilization, this limitation on warfare has taken shape as an
effort to limit both the determination of when war is appropriate and the means used in
battle.(3)
Within the Western moral, legal, and political arena, the connected questions of when
war is appropriate and what means are acceptable in warfare has been the subject of a
great deal of examination. The basic theory which has arisen within Western culture to
evaluate the legitimacy of military action is called just war theory.(4) The just war theory
has received widespread acceptance both within Western culture and in the international
community as a means by which a war may be determined to be justified or not.(5) Just
war theory, which has both religious and secular proponents, is perhaps the most
universally recognized moral theory by which the use of force may be evaluated.
This article will attempt to determine whether the decision by the United States
government to launch air strikes against Iraqi military forces in September, 1996 is
justified under just war theory. This article will first present a general overview of just
war theory, including its background, main sources, and generally recognized principles.
This article will then present a brief factual overview of the U.S. action, and will analyze
that action in light of the criteria of just war theory, demonstrating that the recent U.S.
military strikes against Iraq do not meet the criteria of just war theory as commonly
understood.
II. A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF JUST WAR THEORY
A. BACKGROUND ON JUST WAR THEORY
Just war theory has a varied and diverse background.(6) The just war tradition includes the
contributions of philosophers and theologians dating back to Roman times. As James
Tuner Johnson has pointed out, Just war is an historical tradition formed by experience and reflection, including much that is neither specifically theological (or even religious), nor philosophical. It has been strongly influenced by international law, the traditions of chivalry, and soldierly practices derived from the experience of many battles.(7)
Just war theory as a method of evaluating military actions has been recognized
historically by thinkers as varied as Cicero, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Grotius,
and Daniel Webster. It is a theory which has been used by Christians and non-Christians
alike to determine whether or not the decision to go to war and the means used to prosecute that war are just. It is crucial to keep this varied and complex pedigree of the
just war tradition in mind when dealing with just war theory, otherwise it becomes
possible to restrict the "breadth and diversity of the tradition,"(8) which could in turn lead
to a serious misapplication of the theory in a particular circumstance. Understanding,
then, that the theory of just war is one in which many sources mingle over the course of
centuries, it is helpful to make a brief overview of those sources before delving into the
main task of explaining and applying just war theory to the particular problem raised in
this article, namely, whether the recent use of force by the United States against Iraq is
justified under the theory.
B. MAIN SOURCES OF JUST WAR THEORY
1. The Religious Sources of Just War Theory
Many of the key thinkers who have expounded on just war theory through the centuries
have identified themselves with the Christian faith, both in its Catholic and Protestant
varieties. Just war theory has also gained a general acceptance among Christian
theologians, philosophers, and jurists as a method of passing judgment on the morality or
immorality of a particular conflict.(9) The general Christian conception of just war theory
forms the core of secular just war theory and as such has had a tremendous influence on
the secular conception of the just war.(10)
Early Christian approaches to war were largely pacifistic in nature, due to a focus in the
early Church to the notion that Christians were distinct from the rest of society.(11)
However, with the growing Christianization of the Roman Empire, and the increasing
political and social influence of the Christian Church, Christian theologians during the
fourth and fifth centuries began to develop justifications for the use of force which would
eventually take shape over time as just war theory.(12)
The first major Christian theologian to address himself to the task of determining the
circumstances under which war is legitimate was St. Augustine of Hippo.(13) Augustine
held that "[t]he natural order, which is suited to the peace of moral things, requires that
the authority and deliberation for undertaking war be under the control of a leader."(14)
For Augustine, war is a permissible part of the life of a nation, and the power of
prosecuting a war was part of the natural powers of a monarch, ordained to uphold
peace.(15) War, far from being something which Christians should shun, is part of the life
of a nation, ordained by natural law, a law which according to the New Testament is
ordained by God.(16)
Augustine's conception of the just war did not create a carte blanche for bloodshed.(17) In
formulating his ideas on war, St. Augustine was careful to state the purposes for which
war may be fought, and the procedural means which must be satisfied in order for a war
to be just. "[F]or it makes a great difference," he wrote, "by which causes and under
which authorities men undertake the wars that must be waged."(18) For Augustine, for a
war to be just, it must be fought for the right reasons, and it must be waged under rightful
authority.(19)
Augustine held that the only reason which justified war was the desire for peace. "Peace
is not sought in order to provide war, but war is waged in order to attain peace."(20)
Augustine criticizes other motives for war, such as "[t]he desire for harming, the cruelty
of revenge, the restless and implacable mind, the savageness of revolting, the lust for
dominating, and similar things,"(21) and refers to them as things which are "justly blamed
in wars."(22) In fighting a war, the goal must be to do that which is necessary to obtain
peace; "[l]et necessity slay the warring foe, not your will."(23) Augustine also includes
under the subject of necessity the just treatment of prisoners and conquered peoples,
making it clear that mercy should be shown to the vanquished, particularly if they are no
longer a threat to peace.(24)
Besides right intention, St. Augustine also held that it was necessary for a war to be
waged under lawful authority.(25) The purpose of the war-making powers of the state is to
ensure peace, which in turn helps to foster the common-good of those in society.(26)
Augustine recognized that it was necessary for the authority and decision to undertake
war to be made by a recognized leader.(27) In addition, the soldiers who serve under the
leader must serve the peace and common-good of society.(28) Warfare which is declared
by unlawful authority therefore fails to meet this criteria, as does warfare which is not
directed toward peace and the common good.
The second major Christian thinker to deal with the issue of war is St. Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274).(29) Aquinas based himself upon St. Augustine's view of war, elaborating on
the teachings of the bishop of Hippo.(30) In explicating his theory regarding the justness of
a war, Aquinas focused on defining the right to make war and the importance of the
intent which stands behind the decision to go to war.(31) In his attempt to formulate a
simple rule which would give guidance on these issues, Aquinas argued that a war is
justified when three basic, necessary conditions were met: 1. the war was prosecuted by a
lawful authority with the power to wage war;(32) 2. the war was undertaken with just
cause;(33) and 3. the war was undertaken with the right intention, that is, "to achieve some
good or to avoid some evil."(34) Together with St. Augustine, Aquinas' views on the
justification of war form the basic core of just war theory, and it is from their concepts
that the theory of just war is adapted and expanded by later thinkers.
2. Secular Sources of Just War Theory
The secular sources for just war theory span a considerable length of time. They include
such philosophers as the ancient Roman Cicero and the Dutch Protestant Hugo Grotius.
In addition, modern decrees on justifiable warfare, such as the commission to the
Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, and the United Nations Charter also act to flush out the
modern conception of just war theory.
Cicero, the great Roman orator, jurist, and philosopher was one of the first to deal with
the questions of justifiable war. Cicero held that the use of force was justifiable only
when the war was declared by an appropriate governmental authority acting within
specific limits.(35) For Cicero, the ability to wage war rested with the state, and the state
alone, and could be lawfully waged only "after an official demand for satisfaction has
been submitted or warning has been given and a formal declaration made."(36) In addition,
Cicero also proposed the existence of a universal norm for human behavior which
transcended the laws of individual nations and governed their relations with each other.
(37) Cicero's belief in this universal norm was grounded in his view that there was a
humani generis societas, a "society of mankind [sic] rather than of states."(38) This view
of a universal standard of behavior for nation-states which exists outside of promulgated
law would have a profound impact on later just war theorists, particularly on Hugo
Grotius.
Grotius was a 16th century Dutch Protestant who is sometimes referred to as the father of
international law.(39) Grotius, who lived in the aftermath of the brutal Thirty-Years War in
Europe, wrote extensively on the right of nations to use force in self-defense in his book
Jure Belli ac Pacis ("On the Rights of War and Peace"), which was published in 1625.(40)
It was largely Grotius who secularized just war theory,(41) making the theory more
acceptable for the age of the Enlightenment. For Grotius, a war is just if three basic
criteria were met: 1) the danger faced by the nation is immediate; 2) the force used is
necessary to adequately defend the nation's interests; and 3) the use of force is
proportionate to the threatened danger.(42)
Grotius grounded his agreement with Cicero's notion of the need for a declaration of war
in the natural law, and also argued that the purpose of just war theory is to provide
"succor and protection for the sick and wounded in war, combatants and civilians
alike."(43) A result of this view is the notion that just war theory exists externally of any
recognized legal system, that it is a part of the "law of nations" which is followed by all
civilized nations.(44) For Grotius, it is not necessary to prove just war theory by consulting
with any of the established laws of the nations of Europe, or their customs.(45) Rather,
those laws are known through the universal medium of the natural law, a law which
transcends nations and their own particular legal codes, a law which is binding on all
human societies in their interactions with each other.(46)
After Grotius, just war theory underwent relatively few modifications until the nineteenth
century. During the first century of it's existence, the United States' government came to
acknowledge the legitimacy of just war theory. In 1842, the U.S. Secretary of State,
Daniel Webster, acknowledged the legitimacy of the customary norms employed by
Grotius to define the just war.(47) This recognition occurred as a result of attempts to
resolve the so-called "Caroline Incident."(48)
The Caroline Incident occurred when the British attempted to prevent supplies from
reaching Canadian rebels.(49) In their attempts to restrict the flow of material to the rebels,
the British burned the U.S. ship Caroline and killed several U.S. citizens.(50) When the
United States protested, the British government responded that its actions were justified
as a matter of self-defense.(51) Webster responded by stating that the only way for the
British claim to self-defense to stand was if it met the traditional elements of just selfdefense.(
52) Webster outlined those elements as consisting of necessity of self-defense,
and the reasonable and not excessive use of force.(53) In essence, this definition of just
self-defense mirrors that proposed by Grotius.
During the remainder of the 19th and early 20th centuries, just war theory underwent
modest development. There were treaties, such as the Hague Conventions, which codified
just war theory, but there was little major development in just war theory. That changed
with the end of the Second World War. As a result of World War II, two basic documents
were issued which resulted in increased recognition of just war theory in the international
arena. The first document is the charter for the Nuremberg war crimes trials, and the
second is the United Nations Charter. The Nuremberg Charter encapsulated the reigning
notion of just war theory as represented by both St. Thomas Aquinas and Grotius.(54) The
Nuremberg Tribunal established that just war theory, as Grotius understood it, is
universally binding customary law.(55)
The United Nations Charter also has contributed to just war theory by recognizing the
inherent right of each sovereign nation to self-defense.(56) Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
affirms the right of each nation to self-defense, until the Security Council can take action
in order to restore and stabilize international peace and security.(57) Article 51 states two
key points in regard to international relations and the rightful use of force in international
disputes: 1) the regulation of the use of force; and 2) collective security.(58) The U.N.
Charter effectively outlaws the use of military force as a method of resolving
international conflicts between nation-states.(59) At the same time, the charter recognizes
the inherent right of each nation to defend itself from an attack from an exterior foe
which is by its very nature unlawful.(60) This right of a nation to engage in defensive
military actions has also been upheld by the International Court of Justice in its ruling in
the case of Nicaragua v. United States of America.(61) In that case, Nicaragua brought
action against the United States for its support of insurgency forces attempting to
overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.(62) The International Court of Justice
in its ruling held that the right of a nation to engage in self-defense, as customarily
understood, was incorporated into Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.(63) As the Court stated,
"[i]n the language of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the inherent right (or droit
naturel) which a State possesses in the event of an armed attack, covers both collective
and individual self-defense."
B. GENERALLY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES OF JUST WAR THEORY
As the proceeding section has demonstrated, just war theory, despite its diverse sources
and historical development, has several commonly recognized elements. These elements
are traditionally divided into two basic categories which deal with the two basic
fundamental issues regarding the legitimacy of war.(64) The first issue, sometimes referred
to in Latin as the jus ad bellum (literally, "that which is right or just to engage in resort to
war"(65)), concerns when it is appropriate to resort to war as a method of conflict
resolution.(66) The second issue, jus in bello (literally, "that which is right or just within
war"(67)) deals with what methods of warfare are permissible within the context of a war
which meets the criteria of the jus ad bellum.(68) Since this article is interested only in
evaluating the validity of the decision made by the U.S. government to launch air strikes
against Iraq, it will limit its discussion on just war theory to the jus ad bellum.
The core elements of the jus ad bellum consist of those principles which were originally
recognized by the medieval commentators on just war theory as being most central to the
whole doctrine of just war.(69) As elucidated by St. Thomas Aquinas, the core principles
consist of the following three elements: 1) just cause; 2) competent authority; and 3) right
intention.(70)
Just cause is classically understood to refer to self-defense.(71) The use of military force is
justified when it is used to repel an unjust aggressor and to retake that which the unjust
aggressor has taken.(72) It is generally acknowledged that a nation may use force to
protect a neighboring state from attack from an outside hostile power.(73) Thus, defense of
self, or defense of another, are legitimate reasons for a nation-state to resort to military
force.
The second element of jus ad bellum is that the war must be declared by competent
authority.(74) As recognized by theorists like Cicero and Aquinas, for a war to be just, the
decision to go to war must be lawfully made.(75) If an illegal or non-legal authority within
an nation made the decision to go to war, such a decision would be unjust, for it would
violate the basic principles of how a given society is governed.(76)
Finally, the war must be fought with right intention, meaning that the motives for the war
must not be to inflict undue suffering on the enemy state; the defending nation must use
only that amount of force which is necessary for it to achieve its just cause.(77) The
motives of those engaged in making the decision to go to war must not be tinged with
vengeance or a desire for retribution.(78) Rather, the decision to go to war must be
essentially protective; the goal of war is to obtain a just and durable peace.(79) Such a
peace is unlikely if the war is waged out of hateful or vengeful motives, with a desire not
solely for self-protection but the total destruction of the enemy.(80) If in it's actions, the
defending state's use of force exceeds what is necessary for the success of its just cause,
the defending state's right intention is problematic.(81) Seen this way, right intention
serves to reinforce the requirement that the state which seeks to justly use force be acting
in a truly defensive capacity, rather than engaging in military adventurism on the pretext
of self-defense.
III. APPLICATION OF JUST WAR THEORY TO U.S. ACTIONS
1. Candidate for juris doctorate degree, May 1997, Gonzaga University School of Law,
Spokane, WA.
2. James Turner Johnson, "Just War Tradition and Low-Intensity Conflict" in Legal and
Moral Constraints on Low-Intensity Conflict, 147, 148 (Alberto R. Coll, et al. eds. 1995).
For examples of the diverse background of theories to limit warfare, see the dissenting
opinion of Judge Weeramantry of the International Court of Justice in the I.C.J.'s decision
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 95 (July 8), Internet
address at http://www.dfat.gov.au/ild/icj_nuc/w_man_c.html.
3. Examples of the efforts of the international community to limit warfare are quite
extensive, and stretch back well into the Middle Ages. As Judith Gail Gardam points out
in her article Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 Am. J. Int'l L. 391, 395
(1993), the Catholic Church was active in the Middle Ages in limiting warfare, as seen by
the Second Lateran Council's prohibition in 1139 of the use of crossbows, bows and
arrows, and siege weapons in conflicts between Christian nations. Id. In the 19th century,
secular attempts were made to limit warfare, such as the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration
which prohibited the use of weapons which cause unnecessary suffering and also forbade
the practice of denying quarter to a vanquished enemy. Id. at 397. Finally, during the 20th
century, several conventions, such as the Hague Convention (No. IV) of 1907, the Hague
Rules of Air Warfare (1923), the Geneva Convention (1947), and the United Nations
Charter all sought to limit the extent of the means of warfare. Id. at 399-402
4. Johnson at 148
5. The widespread use of just war theory by both Western countries and the international
community can be seen in the use of just war theory by the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg. The Nuremberg tribunal used the basic just war categories to
determine if the actions taken by the Axis powers were in accord with international law.
See Article 6(a) and (b) of the Nuremberg Charter, reprinted in Telford Taylor, The
Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials 648 (1992). See also Nicholas Rostow, The World
Health Organization, The International Court of Justice, and Nuclear Weapons, 20 Yale J.
Int'l L. 151, 163-175 (1995) for a general overview of the law of armed conflict, and
especially pages 169-70 for the use of just war concepts such as proportionality and
legality by the Nuremberg Tribunal
6. Johnson at 147-149. According to Johnson, just war theory incorporates moral
reflection, theology, philosophy, chivalric custom and military practice, ecclesiastical
canon law, secular civil law, and diplomatic precedent among rulers. Id. at 148-149
7. Id. at 148
8. Id. at 149
9. See generally Paul Ramsey, War and the Christian Conscience (1961) and The Just
War: Force and Political Responsibility (1968). See also the National Conference of
Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace (1983); Richard J. Mouw, The Spiritual Thrust
of Just War Doctrine, New Oxford Review, Mar. 1988, at 11; Mark Juergensmeyer, The
Terrorists Who Long for Peace, 20-Spg. Fletcher F. World Aff. 1, 5 (1996)
10. Gardam at 817
11. Id. at 223
12. Id., citing R. Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace 14 (1960)
13. Id. at 223
14. St. Augustine of Hippo, Against Faustus the Manichaean XXII.73-79, in Augustine:
Political Writings, 222 (Michael W. Tkacz and Douglas Kries, trans, Ernest L. Fortin and
Douglas Kries, eds. 1994)
15. Id. at 220
16. See Romans 2:14-15 (Douay-Rheims Version) where the Apostle Paul writes that
there is a natural law written on the human heart by which the actions of men may be
evaluated
17. Augustine at 221-222
18. Id. at 222
19. Id. at 220, 222
20. Id. at 220
21. Id. at 221
22. Id. at 222
23. Augustine at 220
24. Id
25. Id. at 222
26. Id. at 220-222
27. Id. at 222
28. Augustine at 222
29. St. Thomas deals with the question of the legitimacy of war in his Summa
Theologicae, Part II, II, Q. 40, Art. 1
30. Id., especially Reply Obj. 1-3 where St. Thomas bases his arguments heavily on the
writings of St. Augustine
31. Aquinas, Summa Theologicae, II, II, Q. 40, Art. 1
32. Id
33. Id
34. Id
35. David J. Bederman, Reception of the Classical Tradition in International Law:
Grotius' De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, 10 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 1, 31-32 (1996)
36. Id.
37. Id. at 6
38. Id
39. Bederman at 1
40. Id
41. Roberts at 225. See also Johnson at 151
42. Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (1949) cited in Ziyad Motala
and David T. ButleRitchie, Self-Defense in International Law, the United Nations, and
the Bosnian Conflict, 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 10 n.75 (1995)
43. Bederman at 32
44. Roberts at 225
45. Bederman at 32
46. Id
47. Motala at 10
48. Id
49. Id
50. Id
51. Id. at 11
52. Motala at 11. See also H.R. Exec. Doc. Nos 302 & 73, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. (1837)
53. Id
54. See the Nuremberg Charter, art. 6(a)-(c). The charter lists the waging of aggressive
war, "violations of the laws or customs of war," and the extermination and enslavement
of civilians among its examples of wartime criminal conduct. Id
55. Rostow at 169-70
56. United Nations Charter, articles 2(4) and 51. See also Gardam at 403-11; Motala at 3
57. U.N. Charter art. 51
58. Motala at 4
59. Id
60. Id
61. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), 1986 I.C.J. 14. The International Court of
Justice did not decide this case based on the U.N. Charter because of a reservation made
by the United States. See Louis Henkin, "Law and U.S. Policy" in Might v. Right:
International Law and the Use of Force 47 n.22 (2d ed.1991). The Court instead looked at
customary international law for its authority. Id. However, it is crucial to note that the
Court held that the U.N. Charter and traditional customary international law were, in the
words of one commentator, "essentially congruent in relevant respects, in effect
construing the Charter." Id
62. U.S. v. Nicaragua at 18-19; see also Barry E. Carter and Phillip R. Trimble,
International Law, 2d ed. 310, 311 (2d ed. 1995)
63. Nicaragua v. United States of America at 94, 102-103; see also Motala at 11
64. H.A. Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation
Movements, 17 (1988); Roberts at 222; Johnson at 149; Bederman at 29. The tradition of
dividing just war theory into two distinct analytical categories has its roots in the work of
Grotius, Aquinas, Augustine, and Cicero. Bederman at 29
65. Johnson at 149; Wilson at 17
66. Roberts at 222; Johnson at 149; Wilson at 17
67. Johnson at 149
68. Id
69. Id
70. Aquinas, Summa Theologicae, II, II, Q. 40, Art. 1
71. Johnson at 158; see also William V. O'Brien, "Just War Doctrine's Complementary
Role in the International Law of War," in Legal and Moral Constraints on Low-Intensity
Conflict, 181, 189 (Alberto R. coll, et al. eds. 1995). O'Brien writes that "[t]he substance
of the cause in modern just war doctrine is individual and collective self-defense." Id. at
189
72. Johnson at 158
73. U.N. Charter art. 51
74. Johnson at 158. Johnson compares the concept of "right authority" with the modern
concept of sovereignty and argues that the just war notion of authority basically mirrors
the modern notion of sovereignty. Id
75. Bederman at 31-32; Aquinas, Summa Theologicae, II, II, Q. 40, Art.1.
76. Aquinas, Summa Theologicae, II, II, Q. 40, Art. 1
77. O'Brien at 181
78. Id. at 191
79. Id
80. Id. O'Brien sees the requirement of right intention as having two basic sources: one
theological and the other utilitarian. The theological concern behind this requirement, in
O'Brien's view, is the requirement to refrain from hatred and vengeance. The utilitarian
concern, which O'Brien labels as a "prudential requirement of international politics,"
involves the recognition that it is bad public policy to "incur unnecessarily the abiding
hatred of others" while it is good public policy to reconcile with former enemies. Id
81. Id. at 191 |